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EDITORIAL FAVORITISM IN THE FIELD OF LABORATORY 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS* 
Janis Cloos, Matthias Greiff, and Hannes Rusch 
Abstract 
We examine scientific quality and editorial favoritism in the field of experimental economics. 
We use a novel data set containing all original research papers (𝑁 = 569) that exclusively used 
laboratory experiments for data generation and were published in the American Economic 
Review (AER), Experimental Economics (EE), or the Journal of the European Economic 
Association (JEEA) between 1998 and 2018. Several proxies for scientific quality indicate that 
experiments conducted in Europe are of higher quality than experiments conducted in the US: 
European experiments rely on larger numbers of participants as well as participants per 
treatment and receive more citations. For the AER and the JEEA, but not for EE, we find that 
papers authored by economists with social ties to the editors receive significantly fewer 
citations in the years following publication. Detailed analyses using a novel dynamic and 
continuous measure of the co-authorship distance between editors and authors imply that 
authors at longer distances to editors have to write papers of higher quality in order to get 
published in the AER and the JEEA. We find no evidence that this ‘uphill battle’ is associated 
with geographical distance. (JEL: A11, A14, C90, I23) 
Keywords: laboratory experiments, favoritism, methodological standards, network effects 
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The editorial process is a crucial element in scientific competition. Authors compete for sparse 
space in journals, ideally leading to only the best manuscripts being accepted for publication. 
Across journals, editors compete because each editor wants to maximize the quality of her 
journal by publishing the best papers (Card and DellaVigna, 2020). If decisions about 
acceptance and rejection are made solely based on the quality of the manuscript, competition 
ensures that optimal outcomes are achieved. The resulting allocation is efficient in the sense 
that the best rejected manuscript is of lower quality than the worst accepted manuscript. In 
judging the quality of a submitted manuscript, editors play a crucial role. However, when 
editorial decisions are not based on scientific criteria alone but also on others, such as authors' 
social ties to editors, outcomes might be inefficient and scientific progress might suffer.  
Editorial favoritism is a problem, thus, when the quality of published research is negatively 
affected, i.e., when papers written by an editor’s colleagues or former co-authors are published 
while better papers by other scholars are rejected. High shares of published papers by authors 
who are connected to at least one of a given journal's editors are often taken as an indication 
for editorial favoritism. However, this is neither necessary nor sufficient. As pointed out by 
Brogaard et al. (2014, p. 252), the decisive question is “[…] whether editors use information 
advantages to improve selection decisions, or whether they bow to conflicts of interest.” 
Existing studies on effects of author-editor connections (i.e. social ties)  use papers published 
in – usually high ranking general interest – journals (Colussi, 2018; Brogaard et al., 2014; 
Medoff, 2003; Laband and Piette, 1994a). The studies by Colussi (2018) and Brogaard et al. 
(2014) show that the number of papers an author publishes in a given journal increases 
significantly as soon as a close colleague becomes an editor at that journal.  Brogaard et al. 
(2014), Medoff (2003), and Laband and Piette (1994a) show that papers by authors with social 
ties to editors on average receive significantly more citations in the years following publication. 
However, the results of Laband and Piette (1994a) also show that more than two thirds of the 
papers with remarkably few citations were written by authors who had social ties to the editors. 
Taken together, the results from previous studies suggest that (1) social ties can improve the 
chances of getting published because they reduce editors’ search costs for high-quality papers, 
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and (2) that, conditional on being accepted for publication papers by authors with social ties to 
editors receive more citations on average.  
Most of the existing literature on editorial favoritism proxies the quality of papers solely ex 
post, i.e. based on the number of citations a paper receives in the years following publication. 
Then, previous work typically assesses how the number of citations is affected by social ties, 
authors’ reputation, paper length, JEL codes, and journal. In the field of experimental 
economics, however, several characteristics of an experiment – such as the number of 
participants, the number of participants per treatment, the number of treatments, and the 
strength of monetary incentives – constitute ex ante proxies for an experiment's quality which 
typically also affects the respective paper's quality.  
While the role of such experimental characteristics has been discussed from a methodological 
perspective, their role in the in the editorial process has not been studied yet. With this paper, 
we fill that gap. Our analyses cover all laboratory experiments published between 1998 and 
2018 in the American Economic Review (AER), arguably one of the top journals for general 
economics worldwide, Experimental Economics (EE), the top field journal, and the Journal of 
the European Economic Association (JEEA), arguably one of the European top journals for 
general economics. 
Our focus on experimental economics allows us to examine (1) whether papers written by 
authors from different geographical regions differ with respect to several ex ante proxies 
capturing the scientific quality of the experiments, and (2) whether social ties between editors 
and authors have an effect on the ex post quality of papers (measured in citations) when we 
control for ex ante quality proxies. 
Our results show substantial differences between Europe and the US, the two regions where 
more than 82% of the experiments in our dataset were conducted. For all three journals, 
experiments conducted in Europe have larger average numbers of participants per treatment. In 
the AER and in EE, experiments conducted in Europe also have a larger average total number 
of participants. We also find that AER and EE papers that include experiments conducted in 
Europe receive significantly more citations in the years following publication.  
For all three journals, our results show that the share of US-affiliated authors of a paper has a 
negative effect on the number of citations this paper receives. For AER and JEEA papers, our 
measure for the co-author distance between editors and authors also shows that papers by 
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authors at larger distances to editors receive significantly more citations. Moreover, additional 
binary connection measures show that AER and JEEA papers by authors with social ties to 
editors receive fewer citations in the years following publication. 
Our results also indicate that there seems to be no methodological consensus between 
geographical regions on how to conduct economic experiments – or, equivalently, that there 
are different 'experimental schools'. Moreover, our results suggest that journal editors treat 
authors differently, not only with respect to their social ties but also based on authors’ 
affiliations.  
Our study provides important insights that editors can use in order to make their selection of 
research papers more efficient and fairer. Thus, we provide suggestions on how to increase 
impact factors and simultaneously further scientific progress. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the selection 
criteria for journals and papers, the data set, the ex ante quality proxies, and our measures for 
social ties. In Section 3, we compare how quality proxies and social tie measures differ between 
journals and between geographical regions before we test for editorial favoritism. In Section 4, 
we discuss the results, derive policy implications and conclude. 
2. Data Collection and Rationale for Variable Construction 
2.1 Selection Criteria 
Although we are interested in the broad field of experimental economics, we decided to focus 
exclusively on papers that report results from laboratory experiments. Precisely, we focus on 
laboratory experiments that generate data in a controlled process using student participants who 
interact in an artificial environment1. In order to ensure the highest possible comparability, we 
do not consider papers that contain other types of experiments. 
For laboratory experiments, objectively measurable proxies for an experiment’s quality exist. 
Proxies for an experiment's quality are the total number of participants, the number of 
treatments, the number of participants per treatment, and the strength of monetary incentives 
(henceforth, strength of incentives). When conducting a laboratory experiment, the 
                                                     
1 Our data contain papers where the majority of the participants were students. Papers where a large share of 




experimenter has full control over these characteristics. This is generally not the case for field 
experiments. 
We chose the AER and the JEEA because they are general interest journals and the official 
journals of the American Economic Association and the European Economic Association, 
respectively. Moreover, the AER publishes the largest number of experimental papers among 
the top-5 economics journals (Nikiforakis and Slonim, 2019).We did not include any comments 
or papers from AER’s Papers and Proceedings in the dataset. EE is the top field journal, and 
papers published there consist predominantly of laboratory experiments. We chose 1998 as the 
starting year for our analysis because EE was founded that year. EE is the specialized field 
journal of the Economic Science Association.  
2.2 Data Set 
Our data set contains 569 papers published between 1998 and 2018 (407 from EE, 121 from 
the AER, and 41 from the JEEA)2.  
For each paper in our data set, we collected data on the: 
 authors and their affiliations at the time of publication, 
 number of female authors, 
 number of citations received by each author in the five years before publication, 
 total number of pages, 
 total number of references, and 
 paper's number of citations as of mid-November, 2020. 
For all papers, we extracted data on the characteristics of the laboratory experiments reported 
in the papers. For each laboratory experiment we collected data on the: 
 total number of participants, 
 number of treatments, 
 duration of the experiment, 
 average earnings per participant,  
 year in which the experiment was conducted, and 
 place (laboratory) where the experiment was conducted. 
                                                     
2 A full list of the included papers can be found in the supplementary material. 
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In case a paper reported results from more than one laboratory experiment, we computed 
average values for the first four characteristics. Since not all papers report data on all 
characteristics, our data set contains some papers for which some or all of the experiment's 
characteristics are missing. In case of missing values, we tried to obtain the data from working 
paper versions or directly from the authors, which was successful in some cases. Citation data 
was obtained from Google Scholar (GS). 
To identify connections between authors and editors, we collected the names and affiliations of 
all editors and co-editors for each of the three journals, as well as the years in which they served 
as editors or co-editors. Due to the time lag between submission and publication, we consider 
economists who served as editor or co-editor between 1996 and 2016.   
We decided to focus on editors and co-editors and not on referees for three reasons. First, editors 
have the power to overrule referees' recommendations. Second, editors tend to select referees 
to whom they have easy access, implying that social ties between author and editor and between 
author and referee are correlated (Hamermesh, 1994). And third, data on referees is hard to 
obtain (an exception is Card et al., 2020).  
2.3 Proxies for the Quality of Laboratory Experiments 
Our quality proxies can be divided into ex ante and ex post proxies. Ex ante proxies are available 
before a paper is published and can thus be used by editors when deciding whether to reject or 
accept a paper. Ex post proxies measure the quality of a paper after it has been published.  
The first two ex ante proxies are the total number of participants and the number of participants 
per treatment. Both are related to the experiment's statistical power. Experiments with higher 
power are more likely to detect small effects, tend to generate fewer false positives and, hence, 
produce results that are more likely to replicate. This in turn could increase confidence in the 
experiment's results. When designing their experiments, experimental economists often use 
simple rules of thumb, like those explained in List et al. (2011). However, Zhang and Ortmann 
(2013) show that many experiments are underpowered and that rules of thumb provide 
insufficient information about the power of a study. For detailed discussions of power analysis 
in experimental economics see Vasilaky and Brock (2020), Czibor et al. (2019), Ioannidis et al. 
(2017), Bellemare et al. (2016, 2014), and Zhang and Ortmann (2013). 
For a given number of treatments, a larger total number of participants yields more observations 
which increases statistical power if statistical testing is carried out at the participant-level. The 
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number of participants per treatment is a more suitable proxy for the experiment's power if an 
experiment contains a large number of treatments and if the statistical analysis involves a 
pairwise comparison of treatments. Arguably, another possibility is to consider the number of 
independent observations as a proxy for quality. However, what constitutes an independent 
observation is not clearly defined. Thus, we decided not to follow this approach (also see 
chapter 3 in Svorenčík and Maas, 2016).  
The third ex ante proxy is the number of treatments. Ceteris paribus, a larger number of 
treatments increases quality because it allows to test more research hypotheses and/or to rule 
out more alternative explanations. Both increase quality, because tests of more hypotheses 
increase a paper’s scientific contribution and ruling out more alternative hypotheses yields more 
credibility to the authors’ claims. 
The fourth proxy is the strength of incentives. According to the methodological literature on 
laboratory experiments, monetary incentives are related to the quality of an experiment because 
they tend to mitigate experimenter demand effects. Additionally, participants exert more effort 
in judgement and decision tasks, which reduces variance and the resulting data is less noisy 
(Bardsley et al., 2010; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). The use of monetary incentives is an 
established methodological standard in economics (see Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001, 390) and 
all experiments in our data set use monetary incentives. We operationalized the strength of 
incentives by dividing a participant's average earnings (including the show-up fee) by the 
duration of the experiment (in minutes) and converting the result into real 2015 US-Dollars. 
We focus on only one ex post proxy, namely citations3. This does not imply that citations reflect 
a paper's true quality. Rather, we decided to use the number of citations because data on 
citations is widely available and is heavily used (at least as a yardstick) to allocate positions 
and resources (Card et al., 2020; Card and DellaVigna, 2020; Hamermesh, 2018; Moed, 2006; 
Laband and Piette, 1994b). Moreover, assuming that editors seek to maximize their journals' 
impact factor, they have an incentive to accept papers that they expect to receive a high number 
of citations. 
 
                                                     




2.4 Measures for Social Ties between Editors and Authors  
In the following, we introduce four different ways to measure social ties: the share of US 
authors, minDist (our novel measure based on co-authorship data), colleague connection, and 
co-author connection. 
Between 1996 and 2016, the AER had 32 different editors, of which 31 (96.88%) had their 
affiliation at US universities and one (3.12%) in the UK. EE had eight different editors, of 
which five (62.5%) had their affiliation at a US university and three (37.5%) at a European 
university. The JEEA, founded in 2003, had 18 different editors, of which eight (44.44%) had 
their affiliation at a US university and ten (55.56%) at a European university. Given the high 
number of US-based editors, especially on the editorial board of the AER, we use the share of 
US authors for each paper as a first measure of social ties between editors and authors. Here 
we implicitly assume that a social tie is more likely to exist if editor and author have their 
affiliation within the same country (the US in case of the AER). 
All previous studies on editorial favoritism use binary measures for social ties between editors 
and authors. For example, a social tie is assumed if editor and author had their affiliation at the 
same institution in the period of publication. We introduce a novel measure, which is based on 
co-authorship data. Specifically, we compiled a large dynamic network structure allowing us 
to compute all co-author distances between the 58 editors and the 931 authors in our data set at 
the time of publication of the respective paper. The calculation is based on approximately 
450,000 unique papers published between 1950 and 2020 in 1,434 economics journals written 
by 268,000 authors. For each paper, we compute the distances between each author of the paper 
and all editors of the respective journal. Our novel measure, minDist, then is the minimum 
distance between all authors of a paper and all editors of the journal for the corresponding 
publication period. In line with Brogaard et al. (2014) we look at all editors of the respective 
journal two years before the paper was published. If no co-author connections could be 
identified between a single author (or between a group of authors) and the editors, we did not 
assign a value to minDist. These observations (𝑁 = 10) are not considered in the following 
results on minDist. Among the 586 papers for which we were able to calculate minDist, the 
values range from 0 to 9 (mean=4.53, sd=1.52, median & mode=5).  
In addition to minDist, we use two commonly used binary measures of social ties. We assume 
a colleague connection if the author has the same affiliation at the time of publication like one 
of the editors of the respective journal two years before publication. A co-author connection 
exists if an author of the paper is also the editor of the journal (i.e. minDist=0), or if the author 




3.1 How do Quality Proxies and Social Ties differ between Journals?  
The first five rows of Table 1 show mean values for quality proxies and social ties for the three 
journals and p-values from pairwise comparisons across journals. The total number of 
participants, and the number of treatments are significantly higher for the AER and the JEEA 
compared to EE (two-sided Mann-Whitney tests, all p-values < 0.05). The variable strength of 
incentives is significantly higher for the AER compared to EE (p-value < 0.01). The strength 
of incentives could only be computed for 54% of AER papers, 72% of EE papers and 66% of 
JEEA papers. This is because, even in these prestigious journals, many papers do not report the 
number of participants, average earnings per participant, or the duration of the experiment. The 
means of citations per year do significantly differ between all three journals and are highest for 
the AER, followed by the JEEA. 
Rows six to eight show mean values for social ties between authors and editors. In 10.74% of 
the AER papers and 17.07% of the JEEA papers, at least one author of the paper has a 
colleague-connection to one of the editors. These values are significantly higher than for EE 
(two-sided Fisher's exact tests, both p-values < 0.01), where a colleague-connection is found 
for only 3.69% of the papers. The average values for minDist are also significantly lower for 
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p=0.266 p=0.581 p=0.202 
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 Ex post quality proxy 








p<0.001 p=0.015 p<0.001 
 
 Social Ties 
6 colleague 
connection in % 
10.74 3.69 17.07 p=0.005 p=0.284 p=0.002 
7 co-author 
connection in % 
4.96 4.42 0.00 p=0.806 p=0.338 p=0.392 
8 any connection 
in % 
14.05 7.37 17.07 p=0.029 p=0.619 p=0.065 
9 minDist 3.98 4.76 3.93 p<0.001 p=0.415 p<0.001 
Notes. Mean values and number of observations. For rows 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9, the three right columns show the 
exact p-values for two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. For rows 6, 7, and 8, they show p-values for two-sided exact 
Fisher tests. For the calculation of citations per year we only include papers that were published before 2017.  
 
3.2 How do Quality Proxies and Social Ties differ between the US and Europe? 
In Table 2, we look only at laboratory experiments conducted in the US or Europe. Slightly 
more than 82% of the laboratory experiments in our dataset were conducted in these two 
regions. 
With respect to the total number of participants or the number of participants per treatment, 
there appear to be systematic differences between experiments conducted in both regions. 
Except for the JEEA, experiments conducted in Europe involve a significantly larger total 
number of participants. For all journals, European experiments have a significantly larger 
number of participants per treatment. With regard to the number of treatments and the strength 
of incentives, there are no significant differences between North-American and European 
experiments.  
For the AER and EE we observe that laboratory experiments conducted in Europe receive 
significantly more citations per year compared to laboratory experiments conducted in the US. 
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For colleague and co-author connections, we do not find significant differences between the 
US and Europe. However, we observe that for AER and EE papers the social tie measure 
minDist has significantly lower values for experiments conducted in the US.  
TABLE 2. Quality Proxies and Social Tie Measures by Journal and Region. 
Row 
# 
 AER (N=105) EE (N=324) JEEA (N=38) 
  
Ex ante quality proxies 
  US Europe US Europe US Europe 












  p=0.002 p=0.010 p=0.957 












  p=0.674 p=0.550 p=0.844 














  p<0.001 p=0.007 p=0.012 














  p=0.050 p=0.082 p=0.745 
  
Ex post quality proxy 


















connection in % 
15.71 5.71 3.82 3.59 13.33 21.74 
  p=0.211 p=1.000 p=0.681 
7 co-author 
connection in % 
2.90 8.57 5.77 2.50 0.00 0.00 
  0.332 0.166 p=1.000 
8 any connection 17.14 11.43 8.92 5.39 13.33 21.74 
  0.570 0.280 p=0.681 
9 minDist 3.75 4.31 4.31 5.26 4.14 3.87 
  p=0.003 p<0.001 p=0.176 
Notes. Mean values and number of observations. The rows below rows 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 9, show exact p-values 
for two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. The rows below rows 6, 7, and 8, show p-values for two-sided exact Fisher 
tests. For the calculation of citations per year we only include papers that were published before 2017.  
3.3 Is there Evidence for Editorial Favoritism in Laboratory Experimental Economics? 
In the previous subsection, we saw that experiments conducted in Europe receive more citations 
than experiments conducted in the US. In this section, we investigate whether the differences 
in citations are mainly driven by differences in ex ante quality proxies or by social ties between 
authors and editors. Our ex ante proxies are scientific criteria because they are derived from 
methodological considerations (see section 2.3). Hence, we would expect them to influence the 
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quality of a paper, which we proxy by the number of citations. Social ties, however, are non-
scientific criteria, and if they have a negative effect on a paper's quality, this would constitute 
evidence of quality reducing editorial favoritism. 
We start by looking at the relation between the inverse hyperbolic sine (asinh)4 of citations per 
year and minDist in Figure 1. For AER and JEEA papers, we see that there is a positive 
correlation between citations per year and minDist. Thus, Figure 1 shows how papers by 
authors at larger distances to editors receive a higher number of citations than papers written 
by authors with closer connections to the editors. 
 
FIGURE 1. Scatterplots of minDist and asinh(citations per year) by journal. 
Figure 1 is based on raw data, that is, we do not control for differences in ex ante quality 
characteristics and other factors, which might affect the number of citations a paper receives. 
Following Brogaard et al. (2014), Medoff (2003), and Laband and Piette (1994a) we estimate 
the following regression model: 
asinh(𝐶𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐽𝐸𝐸𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4(𝑆𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐸𝑅𝑖) + 𝛽5 (𝑆𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝐽𝐸𝐸𝐴𝑖) +
𝛽6𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝐸𝑖 + 𝛿𝑃𝑖 + 𝜃𝐴𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖       (1) 
The dependent variable asinh (𝐶𝑖) is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the total number of citations 
a paper has received by mid-November, 2020. To ensure that each paper had sufficient time to 
receive citations, we only include papers that were published before 2017.  
Our measure of social ties is 𝑆𝑇𝑖. Dependent on the regression model it indicates either the 
relative share of US-affiliated authors, minDist, a colleague connection, a co-author connection 
or a combination of colleague- and co-author connection (any-connection) for paper 𝑖. Because 
                                                     
4 In the following, we use the asinh transformation to account for 0 citations. This practice is in line with 
previous studies Card and DellaVigna (2020), Card et al. (2020), and Hengel and Moon (2020).  
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the effect of social ties could differ between journals, we include interaction terms for the 
respective social tie measure and indicator variables for journals.  
We control for each paper's age, as well as for several other characteristics that might affect the 
number of citations. 𝐸𝑖 is a vector containing the ex ante quality proxies of the experiments 
reported in paper 𝑖. By including indicator variables for journals, we control for journal fixed 
effects. The vector 𝑃𝑖 contains controls for number of (EE-equivalent) pages, number of 
references, and the JEL-classification. 𝐴𝑖 is a vector containing author related controls for 
gender (share of female authors), reputation (average of citations received in the five years prior 
publication), and number of authors. 
Table 3 shows estimation results for different OLS regression models with standard errors 
clustered by journal (for full results see, appendix Tables 5 and 6). In Panel A, we examine the 
influence of the share of US authors (models 1 to 3) and colleague connections (models 4 to 
6). The results show that, for all three journals, the share of US authors has a negative effect on 
the number of citations. In models 1 and 2, this effect is even stronger for AER and JEEA 
papers. For EE papers, the results of models 4 to 6 indicate that colleague connections have a 
significant positive effect on citations. In contrast, for AER and JEEA papers we observe 
significantly negative effects of colleague connections.  
In the lower half of Table 3 (Panel B), we examine the effect of the minimum co-authorship 
distance (minDist) and a direct authorship or co-authorship (co-author connection, minDist < 2) 
on the number of citations. We observe significant positive effects for the interaction terms of 
minDist with AER or JEEA. This implies that papers by authors at longer distances receive 
significantly more citations than papers by authors with closer connections to the editors. For 
the AER, this effect is also apparent when we consider direct co-author connections. AER 
papers written by the editors themselves or by their co-authors have a significantly lower 
number of citations. When we use the raw number of citations as dependent variable (see, 
appendix Table 11), the results show that a one point increase in minDist for AER papers is 
associated with an increase between 116 and 133 citations.   
The variable colleague connection is significantly positive in all three models in Panel A. The 
variable co-author connection is also significantly positive in model 4 of panel B. This could 




Among the ex ante quality proxies, only the number of treatments and the strength of incentives 
have significant positive effects on citations in several models (see Tables 5 to 12 in the 
appendix).  
Table 3. Impact of Social Ties on Ex Post Paper Quality. 
Panel A  
social ties: share of US authors and colleague-connected papers 
 dependent variable: asinh(GS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
share US authors -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.13***    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
share US auth. * AER -0.41*** -0.27** -0.11    
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.12)    
share US auth. * JEEA -0.14*** -0.33** 0.04    
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.22)    
colleague con.    0.40*** 0.36*** 0.14** 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
colleague con. * AER    -0.64*** -0.51*** -0.25 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.14) 
colleague con. * JEEA    -0.69*** -0.63*** -1.06*** 
    (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) 
E No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
P No No Yes No No Yes 
A No No Yes No No Yes 
N 329 327 318 329 327 318 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.41 0.49 
Panel B       
social ties: minDist and coauthor-connected papers 
 dependent variable: asinh(GS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
minDist -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
minDist * AER 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.22*    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.05)    
minDist * JEEA 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.24***    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)    
co-author connnection    0.06*** -0.01 0.14 
    (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) 
co-aut. con. * AER    -0.86*** -0.92*** -0.87** 
    (0.01) (0.06) (0.20) 
co-aut. con. * JEEA    n.a. n.a. n.a. 
       
E No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
P No No Yes No No Yes 
A No No Yes No No Yes 
N 321 319 310 321 319 310 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.41 0.48 
Notes. OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by journal in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Each regression model includes controls for journal and years since publication. 
At least for the share of US authors, the results of Table 3 may at least partially be driven by 
network effects. In 2018, more than half (57.84%) of all experimental economists on the RePEc 
list (𝑁 = 1,831) of authors in experimental economics had a European affiliation, followed by 
economists with an affiliation in North America (30.20%), Asia (5.90%), Australia or New 
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Zealand (3.82%), South America (1.86%), and Africa (0.38%). In the following, we therefore 
examine whether our results change when we consider solely US papers. 
Table 4 shows the results for regressions exclusively including papers with experiments 
conducted in the US and where the share of US affiliated authors is at least 0.5 (for full results 
see, appendix Table 7). In models 1 and 2, the variable minDist again has a significant positive 
effect on the number of citations for AER and JEEA papers. Due to the small number of 
observations, we combined the variables colleague connection and co-author connection into 
the variable any connection. In models 4 and 5, we observe that AER papers by authors with 
connections to the editors receive significantly fewer citations. 
Table 4. Impact of Social Ties on Ex Post Paper Quality (only US papers). 
US papers       
social ties: minDist (models 1-3); any connection (colleague connection or co-author connection) 
 dependent variable: asinh(GS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
minDist -0.01 -0.00 -0.03*    
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)    
minDist * AER 0.21*** 0.25** 0.20    
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.11)    
minDist * JEEA 0.84*** 0.63* 0.11    
 (0.02) (0.22) (0.04)    
any-connection    0.22** 0.10* 0.07 
    (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) 
any-connection * AER    -0.45*** -0.23* -0.03 
    (0.04) (0.06) (0.11) 
any-connection * JEEA    0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (.) (.) (.) 
E No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
P No No Yes No No Yes 
A No No Yes No No Yes 
N 113 112 111 116 115 114 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.44 
Notes. OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by journal in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Each regression model includes controls for journal and years since publication. 
Regarding the ex ante quality proxies (suppressed in Tables 3 and 4), positive signs are observed 
for the number of treatments and the strength of incentives. These effects, however, are not 
always significant. We find no effect for the share of female authors. Our results from Tables 
3 and 4 are largely robust when we use citations from Web of Science (WoS) as the dependent 
variable (see, appendix Tables 8 and 9) or when we use alternative specifications of the 





4. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper we use a novel data set containing data on all laboratory experiments published in 
the AER, EE and the JEEA from 1998 to 2018. We identify and compare several objectively 
measurable quality proxies between journals and between the US and Europe and test for 
editorial favoritism. Our study adds several aspects to the existing literature on editorial 
favoritism.  
First, focusing on one particular field allows us to look not only at citations as an ex post quality 
proxy, but also to analyze how various ex ante quality proxies which are available only for 
laboratory experiments (total number of participants, participants per treatment, number of 
treatments, strength of incentives) differ between journals and regions (which may follow 
different methodological traditions). Second, we conduct an empirical analysis on the role of 
the above-mentioned quality characteristics and social ties between authors and editors. In this 
context we introduce minDist, a new measure for social ties which is based on the co-authorship 
distance between authors and editors. In contrast to existing binary measures of social ties, 
minDist is more fine-grained since it allows to capture indirect co-author connections between 
editors and authors. In our calculation of minDist we also considered significantly more journals 
than previous studies used to identify co-author connections. Thus, the use of minDist allows 
us to investigate the effects of (co-author based) social ties also cases like the JEEA where no 
direct co-author connections exist between editors and authors (see Table 3).  Nevertheless, 
minDist also has limitations. For one, it is not straightforward how to interpret large minDist 
values: is the co-author of your co-author’s co-author’s co-author still someone you would 
favor? For the other, we considered all co-authorship connections in the calculation of minDist 
and did not impose any restriction on the time span. As a result, several minDist values may be 
based on co-authorship connections that lie relatively far in the past. However, a restriction of 
the time span would require a definition of when a connection should be classified as expired. 
Since such a definition would necessarily be arbitrary, we did not impose a restriction.   
Our results show that various ex ante quality proxies are higher for AER and JEEA papers than 
for EE papers. This also reflects the higher number of citations per year that papers published 
in the former two journals received. Comparing experiments conducted in the US and Europe, 
there are no differences regarding the number of treatments and no or only small differences 
regarding the strength of incentives. However, European experiments published in the AER and 
EE rely on a significantly larger total number of participants and in all three journals on a 
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significantly larger number of participants per treatment. This difference is most pronounced 
for the AER where, on average, experiments conducted in the US have 55 participants per 
treatment while experiments conducted in Europe have 113 participants per treatment. 
The differences in the total number of participants and participants per treatment could reflect 
different methodological standards. However, they could also indicate substantial barriers to 
entry for European economists, especially for the AER, where US-dominance is more 
pronounced in the composition of the editorial board. Our results for the total number of 
participants and the strength of incentives imply that experimental economists from Europe 
pay a higher price for publishing their papers, compared to experimental economists from the 
US. However, our data cannot answer if this is due to barriers of entry or due to economists in 
Europe having easier access to research funding compared to their colleagues in the US5. 
Different measures of social ties show that there are closer social ties between authors and 
editors for AER and JEEA papers than there are for EE papers. A potential explanation for this 
result is that the number of EE editors during the respective period was significantly smaller 
than the number of editors in the other two journals.  
Our investigation of editorial favoritism shows that the share of US authors in the top general 
interest journals AER and JEEA has a significant negative effect on the number of citations a 
paper received. For AER and JEEA papers, several measures of social ties indicate that papers 
by authors with social ties or closer connections to the editors are of lower quality than papers 
without these social ties.  
These differences can be interpreted as indirect evidence of discrimination, indicating that a 
paper from an author with social ties is accepted for publication despite a higher-quality paper 
from an author without social ties being available. Of course, this only holds true if high-quality 
papers by authors without social ties to the editorial board were submitted and rejected. 
                                                     
5 We thank Gary Charness for drawing our attention to this aspect. Unfortunately, there are no data on the amount 
of research funding for experimental economists in different regions. However, we consider it unlikely that there 
is a causal relationship between the availability of research funding and the average total number of participants. 




However, given the high rejection rates of the AER and the JEEA, we think that this is quite 
plausible6. 
Note, however, that our results do not imply that editors consciously discriminate against 
authors from outside the US or against authors at longer co-authorship distances to themselves. 
Rather, it is possible that editors systematically fail to predict the number of citations a paper 
will receive in the years following its publication (i.e., editors might wrongly predict that papers 
authored by US-based and/or connected authors receive more citations than they actually do). 
Nonetheless, if citations can be taken as a proxy for quality, this will slow down scientific 
progress, and editors will fail to maximize their journal's impact factor.  
Except for the share of US authors, we find no negative or significantly positive effects of social 
ties for EE papers. This might be explained by the fact that EE is a field journal. EE editors 
usually have an in-depth expertise in experimental economics and may thus be particularly well 
qualified to identify high quality experimental papers. Editors of the AER and the JEEA do not 
necessarily have expertise in experimental economics. While experimental papers are certainly 
reviewed by referees with an expertise in experimental economics also in these general interest 
journals, review processes are only initiated if the papers have not been desk-rejected 
immediately. In order to avoid that potentially promising high quality papers are mistakenly 
desk-rejected, thus, editors whose expertise only partly matches the method used in a submitted 
paper could intensify their efforts to obtain second opinions from colleagues who are more 
competent with regard to this method. 
We hope that our results raise an awareness of potential biases in the editorial process among 
editorial boards and that these biases will thereby be reduced in the longer term. Journals could 
facilitate further research on editorial favoritism (and discriminating editorial practices in 
general) by regularly publishing not only numbers on submissions, desk-rejections, revise and 
resubmit decisions, etc., but also on which countries or institutions the submissions came from. 
In this context, it would also be useful to report the gender distribution of authors for 
submissions. By comparing published papers with all submissions, future studies could 
investigate whether authors from certain countries, from certain institutions, or of a certain 
gender are over- or under-represented in the published papers. Moreover, in their selection of 
                                                     
6 In 2019, for example, only 6.95% of all submissions (N=1,927) were accepted at the AER (Duflo 2020). The 
JEEA received 1,252 submissions between Q4 2019 and Q3 2020 and desk-rejected 60% of these papers (Source: 
Tweet by Imran Rasul on January 6, 2021). 
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new editors and associate editors, editorial board members could pay explicit attention not only 




Angus, S.D., Atalay, K., Newton, J. and Ubilava, D. (2020). “Geographic Diversity in 
Economic Publishing.” Available at SSRN. 
Bardsley, N., Cubitt, R., Loomes, G., Moffatt, P., Starmer, C. and Sugden R. (2010). 
Experimental Economics - Rethinking the Rules. Princeton University Press. 
Bellemare, C., Bissonnette, L. and Kröger S. (2014). "Statistical power of within and 
between-subjects designs in economic experiments." IZA Discussion Paper No. 8583. 
Bellemare, C., Bissonnette, L. and Kröger S. (2016). "Simulating power of economic 
experiments: the powerBBK package." Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2(2), 
157-168. 
Brogaard, J., Engelberg, J. and Parsons, C.A. (2014). "Networks and productivity: Causal 
evidence from editor rotations." Journal of Financial Economics, 111(1), 251-270. 
Camerer, C.F. and Hogarth, R.M. (1999). "The effects of financial incentives in experiments: 
A review and capital-labor-production framework." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1-3), 
7-42. 
Card, D. and DellaVigna, S. (2020). "What do editors maximize? Evidence from four 
economics journals." Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(1), 195-217. 
Card, D., DellaVigna, S., Funk, P. and Iriberri, N. (2020). "Are referees and editors in 
economics gender neutral?." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(1), 269-327. 
Colussi, T. (2018). "Social ties in academia: A friend is a treasure." Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 100(1), 45-50. 
Czibor, E., Jimenez‐Gomez, D. and List, J. A. (2019). "The dozen things experimental 
economists should do (more of)." Southern Economic Journal, 86(2), 371-432. 
Duflo, E. (2020). “Report of the Editor: American Economic Review.” AEA Papers and 
Proceedings, 110, 660-74. 
Hamermesh, D.S. (1994). "Facts and myths about refereeing." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 8(1), 153-163. 
Hamermesh, D.S. (2018). "Citations in economics: Measurement, uses, and impacts." Journal 
of Economic Literature, 56(1), 115-56. 
Hengel, E. and Moon, E. (2020). "Gender and quality at top economics journals." Working 
Paper, University of Liverpool, UK. 
Hertwig, R. and Ortmann, A. (2001). "Experimental practices in economics: A 
methodological challenge for psychologists?." Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(3), 383-
403. 
Ioannidis, J.P.A., Stanley, T.D. and Doucouliagos, H. (2017). "The power of bias in 
economics research." The Economic Journal, 127(605), 236-265. 
21 
 
Laband, D.N. and Piette, M.J. (1994). "Favoritism versus search for good papers: Empirical 
evidence regarding the behavior of journal editors." Journal of Political Economy, 102(1), 
194-203. 
Laband, D.N. and Piette, M.J. (1994b). "The relative impacts of economics journals: 1970-
1990." Journal of Economic Literature, 32(2), 640-666. 
List, J.A., Sadoff, S. and Wagner, M. (2011). “So you want to run an experiment, now what? 
Some simple rules of thumb for optimal experimental design.” Experimental Economics, 
14(4), 439. 
Medoff, M.H. (2003). "Editorial favoritism in economics?." Southern Economic Journal 
(2003): 425-434. 
Moed, H.F. (2006). Citation analysis in research evaluation. Vol. 9. Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
Nikiforakis, N. and Slonim, R. (2019). "Editors’ Preface: Trends in experimental economics 
(1975–2018)." Journal of the Economic Science Association, 5, 1-6. 
Palser, E.R., Lazerwitz, M. and Fotopoulou, K. (2021). “Gender and geographical disparity in 
editorial boards of journals in psychology and neuroscience.” bioRxiv. 
Svorenčík, A. and Maas, H. (2016). The making of experimental economics: Witness seminar 
on the emergence of a field. Springer. 
Vasilaky, K.N. and Brock, J.M. (2020). “Power(ful) guidelines for experimental economists.” 
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 6(2), 189-212. 
Zhang, L. and Ortmann, A. (2013). "Exploring the meaning of significance in experimental 





Table 5. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results I). 
 dependent variable: asinh(GS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER 1.87*** 1.72*** 1.71*** 1.66*** 1.57*** 1.63*** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) 
JEEA 1.18*** 1.22*** 0.95** 1.21*** 1.15*** 1.11*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
share US auth. -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.13***    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
share US auth. * AER -0.41*** -0.27** -0.11    
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.12)    
share US auth. * JEEA -0.14*** -0.33** 0.04    
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.22)    
colleague con.    0.40*** 0.36*** 0.14** 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
colleague con. * AER    -0.64*** -0.51*** -0.25 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.14) 
colleague con. * JEEA    -0.69*** -0.63*** -1.06*** 
    (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) 
age 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
part. per treatment  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
treatments  0.04** 0.04  0.04*** 0.04 
  (0.01) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.02) 
strength of incentives  0.57* 0.47  0.61* 0.49 
  (0.14) (0.21)  (0.20) (0.25) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   -0.02   -0.02 
   (0.02)   (0.02) 
references   0.01   0.02 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
JEL-micro   -0.08   -0.07 
   (0.17)   (0.17) 
JEL-theory   -0.38   -0.40* 
   (0.15)   (0.12) 
JEL-labor   -0.14   -0.11 
   (0.31)   (0.28) 
JEL-econometrics   -0.81**   -0.78** 
   (0.15)   (0.15) 
JEL-industrial   -1.51**   -1.58*** 
   (0.18)   (0.15) 
JEL-international   -4.72***   -4.65*** 
   (0.44)   (0.39) 
JEL-finance   -1.08***   -1.03*** 
   (0.08)   (0.07) 
JEL-public   0.94*   0.94 
   (0.29)   (0.33) 
JEL-health   -1.61   -1.65 
   (0.65)   (0.58) 
JEL-development   -0.59   -0.46 
   (0.38)   (0.30) 
JEL-other   0.08   0.02 
   (0.40)   (0.39) 
share fem. auth.   0.10   0.08 
   (0.19)   (0.19) 
reputation   0.00   0.00** 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
number of auth.   -0.05   -0.04 
   (0.05)   (0.05) 
Constant 3.40*** 3.01*** 3.05*** 3.38*** 2.94*** 2.98*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.12) 
N 329 327 318 329 327 318 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.41 0.49 





Table 6. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results II). 
 dependent variable: asinh(GS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER 0.28*** 0.16** 0.71 1.67*** 1.58*** 1.66*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.29) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) 
JEEA 0.54*** 0.44** -0.12 1.10*** 1.06*** 0.91*** 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) 
minDist -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
minDist * AER 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.22*    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.05)    
minDist * JEEA 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.24***    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)    
co-aut. con.    0.06*** -0.01 0.14 
    (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) 
co-aut. con. * AER    -0.86*** -0.92*** -0.87** 
    (0.01) (0.06) (0.20) 
co-aut. con. * JEEA    0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (.) (.) (.) 
age 0.08*** 0.08** 0.10** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
part. per treatment  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
treatments  0.04** 0.04  0.04*** 0.04 
  (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.02) 
strength of incentives  0.74 0.54  0.70 0.54 
  (0.32) (0.34)  (0.28) (0.34) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   -0.02   -0.02 
   (0.02)   (0.02) 
references   0.01   0.02 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
JEL-micro   -0.08   -0.09 
   (0.19)   (0.19) 
JEL-theory   -0.40   -0.42 
   (0.17)   (0.16) 
JEL-labor   -0.34*   -0.37* 
   (0.11)   (0.12) 
JEL-econometrics   -0.79**   -0.81** 
   (0.17)   (0.16) 
JEL-industrial   -1.47**   -1.53*** 
   (0.15)   (0.14) 
JEL-international   -5.62***   -5.87*** 
   (0.25)   (0.05) 
JEL-finance   -1.11***   -1.08*** 
   (0.03)   (0.03) 
JEL-public   0.89*   0.99 
   (0.27)   (0.36) 
JEL-health   -1.58*   -1.72 
   (0.52)   (0.61) 
JEL-development   -0.69   -0.62 
   (0.52)   (0.40) 
JEL-other   0.02   0.07 
   (0.33)   (0.38) 
share fem. auth.   0.06   0.00 
   (0.26)   (0.18) 
reputation   0.00**   0.00 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
number of auth.   -0.02   -0.03 
   (0.01)   (0.03) 
Constant 3.47*** 3.00*** 2.99*** 3.40*** 2.94*** 2.95*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.02) (0.16) 
N 321 319 310 321 319 310 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.41 0.48 





Table 7. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results, only US papers). 
 dependent variable: asinh(GS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER 0.68*** 0.43 0.70 1.57*** 1.44*** 1.49*** 
 (0.01) (0.15) (0.47) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) 
JEEA -2.83*** -2.11 0.25 0.90*** 0.80** 0.94*** 
 (0.08) (0.75) (0.42) (0.01) (0.12) (0.06) 
minDist -0.01 -0.00 -0.03*    
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)    
minDist * AER 0.21*** 0.25** 0.20    
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.11)    
minDist * JEEA 0.84*** 0.63* 0.10    
 (0.02) (0.22) (0.05)    
any-connection    0.22** 0.10* 0.07 
    (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) 
any-connection * AER    -0.45*** -0.23* -0.03 
    (0.04) (0.06) (0.11) 
any-connection * JEEA    0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (.) (.) (.) 
age 0.04** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.04* 0.05** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
part. per treatment  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
treatments  0.07 0.05  0.06 0.04* 
  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.01) 
strength of incentives  1.15 0.91  0.98 0.88 
  (1.18) (0.73)  (0.91) (0.44) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   -0.01   -0.01 
   (0.01)   (0.00) 
references   0.01   0.01* 
   (0.01)   (0.00) 
JEL-micro   -0.52   -0.52 
   (0.40)   (0.34) 
JEL-theory   -0.33   -0.34 
   (0.27)   (0.23) 
JEL-labor   -0.78**   -0.60 
   (0.15)   (0.37) 
JEL-econometrics   0.58   0.75* 
   (0.23)   (0.21) 
JEL-industrial   -1.85***   -1.92** 
   (0.08)   (0.25) 
JEL-international   0.00   0.00 
   (.)   (.) 
JEL-finance   -1.76**   -1.67** 
   (0.38)   (0.39) 
JEL-public   -0.41   -0.52* 
   (0.35)   (0.13) 
JEL-health   -2.22***   -2.26*** 
   (0.10)   (0.14) 
JEL-development   -7.00*   -6.95* 
   (1.95)   (2.31) 
JEL-other   1.18   1.17 
   (0.69)   (0.80) 
share fem. auth.   0.24   0.22 
   (0.18)   (0.21) 
reputation   0.00**   0.00 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
number of auth.   -0.11*   -0.15 
   (0.04)   (0.09) 
Constant 3.78*** 2.85*** 3.42*** 3.68*** 2.87*** 3.24*** 
 (0.05) (0.19) (0.17) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) 
N 113 112 111 116 115 114 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.44 





Table 8. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results I, WoS Citations). 
 dependent variable: asinh(WoS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER 1.72*** 1.54*** 1.50*** 1.52*** 1.42*** 1.46*** 
 (0.02) (0.11) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) 
JEEA 0.92*** 0.95*** 0.79** 1.07*** 1.02*** 1.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
share US auth. -0.15*** -0.12** -0.15**    
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
share US auth. * AER -0.39*** -0.22* -0.03    
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.16)    
share US auth. * JEEA 0.12*** -0.04 0.22    
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.19)    
colleague con.    0.10*** 0.04*** -0.10* 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
colleague con. * AER    -0.46*** -0.29** -0.03 
    (0.02) (0.04) (0.11) 
colleague con. * JEEA    -0.56*** -0.54*** -0.94** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) 
age 0.11*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.10*** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
part. per treatment  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
treatments  0.04* 0.04  0.04** 0.04 
  (0.01) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) 
strength of incentives  0.71*** 0.68**  0.76** 0.69** 
  (0.07) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.14) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   -0.02   -0.02 
   (0.02)   (0.02) 
references   0.01   0.01 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
JEL-micro   -0.16   -0.15 
   (0.29)   (0.29) 
JEL-theory   -0.06   -0.07 
   (0.16)   (0.12) 
JEL-labor   -0.28   -0.25 
   (0.31)   (0.30) 
JEL-econometrics   -1.07**   -1.04** 
   (0.22)   (0.21) 
JEL-industrial   -1.31**   -1.44*** 
   (0.16)   (0.12) 
JEL-international   -3.57**   -3.57** 
   (0.45)   (0.37) 
JEL-finance   -1.14*   -1.10** 
   (0.27)   (0.25) 
JEL-public   1.14*   1.08* 
   (0.27)   (0.28) 
JEL-health   -1.07   -1.12 
   (0.73)   (0.63) 
JEL-development   -1.34*   -1.18* 
   (0.43)   (0.31) 
JEL-other   0.30   0.24 
   (0.46)   (0.44) 
share fem. auth.   -0.05   -0.08 
   (0.28)   (0.27) 
reputation   0.00   0.00** 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
number of auth.   -0.06   -0.05 
   (0.04)   (0.04) 
Constant 2.19*** 1.76** 1.86*** 2.19*** 1.71*** 1.82*** 
 (0.06) (0.19) (0.13) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) 
N 302 300 291 302 300 291 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.49 






Table 9. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results II, WoS Citations). 
 dependent variable: asinh(WoS citations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER 0.38*** 0.23*** 0.73 1.53*** 1.44*** 1.50*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
JEEA 0.44** 0.31* -0.04 0.92*** 0.88*** 0.80*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.27) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) 
minDist 0.01 0.01* 0.02    
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)    
minDist * AER 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.18    
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.07)    
minDist * JEEA 0.12** 0.15*** 0.20*    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)    
co-aut. con.    -0.05** -0.13** -0.04 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
co-aut. con. * AER    -0.87*** -0.94*** -0.85* 
    (0.02) (0.07) (0.21) 
co-aut. con. * JEEA    0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (.) (.) (.) 
age 0.10** 0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
part. per treatment  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
treatments  0.04* 0.04  0.04** 0.04 
  (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) 
strength of incentives  0.88** 0.74*  0.86** 0.76* 
  (0.19) (0.24)  (0.17) (0.25) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   -0.02   -0.02 
   (0.02)   (0.02) 
references   0.01   0.01 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
JEL-micro   -0.15   -0.17 
   (0.31)   (0.32) 
JEL-theory   -0.05   -0.07 
   (0.18)   (0.17) 
JEL-labor   -0.53   -0.54 
   (0.21)   (0.22) 
JEL-econometrics   -1.08**   -1.07** 
   (0.25)   (0.23) 
JEL-industrial   -1.24**   -1.34** 
   (0.19)   (0.15) 
JEL-international   -4.33***   -4.38*** 
   (0.37)   (0.09) 
JEL-finance   -1.20**   -1.17** 
   (0.14)   (0.20) 
JEL-public   1.05**   1.14* 
   (0.23)   (0.33) 
JEL-health   -1.01   -1.18 
   (0.62)   (0.67) 
JEL-development   -1.50   -1.40* 
   (0.59)   (0.48) 
JEL-other   0.23   0.26 
   (0.41)   (0.46) 
share fem. auth.   -0.09   -0.15 
   (0.34)   (0.24) 
reputation   0.00**   0.00 
   (0.00)   (0.00) 
number of auth.   -0.01   -0.03 
   (0.01)   (0.03) 
Constant 2.17*** 1.66** 1.65*** 2.20*** 1.70*** 1.77*** 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17) (0.15) 
N 295 293 284 295 293 284 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.44 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.49 





Table 10. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results I, Raw Citations). 
 dependent variable: raw GS citations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER 431.43*** 447.15*** 452.34*** 297.12*** 298.45*** 328.85*** 
 (16.27) (7.73) (40.97) (16.78) (16.92) (10.47) 
JEEA 134.95** 151.80** 157.59** 114.30*** 106.25*** 112.84** 
 (14.63) (16.16) (17.90) (5.05) (5.09) (12.05) 
share US auth. -26.83 -25.55 -35.04    
 (22.53) (24.79) (39.29)    
share US auth. * AER -265.66*** -275.78*** -212.96    
 (1.49) (13.51) (90.62)    
share US auth. * JEEA -98.51*** -134.18*** -104.53    
 (2.16) (4.12) (50.83)    
colleague con.    3.56 -1.05 -10.02 
    (1.40) (0.73) (5.89) 
colleague con. * AER    -181.90*** -179.31*** -124.36 
    (16.85) (15.81) (58.75) 
colleague con. * JEEA    -69.23 -47.13 -57.08 
    (29.94) (34.38) (77.48) 
age 13.41 12.95 10.60 11.90 12.05 10.34* 
 (10.65) (10.14) (3.95) (9.03) (8.79) (2.91) 
part. per treatment  -0.33 -0.20  -0.13 0.01 
  (0.23) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.09) 
treatments  3.95 0.98  6.56** 3.61 
  (4.32) (10.12)  (1.17) (7.20) 
strength of incentives  10.23 20.88  49.06 47.62 
  (16.96) (50.36)  (60.57) (84.42) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   0.01   -0.30 
   (3.42)   (3.30) 
references   -0.23   0.09 
   (2.47)   (2.29) 
JEL-micro   30.86   22.79 
   (12.11)   (12.90) 
JEL-theory   -92.31   -130.72 
   (76.75)   (100.24) 
JEL-labor   -91.23   -64.38 
   (75.11)   (52.85) 
JEL-econometrics   14.59   7.99 
   (42.27)   (42.76) 
JEL-industrial   -68.60*   -77.44** 
   (19.54)   (10.52) 
JEL-international   -16.77   28.38 
   (64.63)   (91.64) 
JEL-finance   -99.28   -92.10 
   (73.51)   (72.12) 
JEL-public   735.21   771.16 
   (741.66)   (786.38) 
JEL-health   -309.64   -326.86 
   (206.72)   (199.39) 
JEL-development   -57.48   -62.05** 
   (69.63)   (11.14) 
JEL-other   157.19   136.95 
   (179.89)   (182.67) 
share fem. auth.   33.79   20.85 
   (47.41)   (35.27) 
reputation   0.01   0.03 
   (0.03)   (0.05) 
number of auth.   -23.37   -18.36 
   (36.54)   (32.45) 
Constant -62.03 -58.84 -8.91 -56.84 -92.20 -58.42 
 (98.54) (73.48) (63.51) (90.57) (102.05) (32.99) 
N 329 327 318 329 327 318 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.16 0.16 0.27 





Table 11. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results II, Raw Citations). 
 dependent variable: raw GS citations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER -270.64*** -277.34*** -178.93** 288.71*** 288.58*** 321.48*** 
 (0.20) (14.68) (26.32) (16.07) (18.20) (9.32) 
JEEA 21.05 31.47 65.05 95.95** 93.71*** 101.27* 
 (28.85) (37.53) (112.13) (10.22) (8.97) (23.56) 
minDist -1.02*** -0.12 -7.10    
 (0.02) (0.72) (7.07)    
minDist * AER 133.46*** 135.24*** 116.06***    
 (3.19) (0.95) (7.29)    
minDist * JEEA 18.41* 16.02 5.63    
 (4.82) (6.71) (24.75)    
co-aut. con.    -16.93 -30.90 39.05 
    (12.39) (18.98) (44.79) 
co-aut. con. * AER    -223.25** -233.66*** -266.74*** 
    (22.84) (9.67) (21.54) 
co-aut. con. * JEEA    0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (.) (.) (.) 
age 10.61 10.47 9.06** 11.34 11.42 9.61** 
 (7.20) (6.70) (1.41) (8.12) (7.79) (1.89) 
part. per treatment  -0.17 -0.04  -0.13 0.00 
  (0.18) (0.12)  (0.14) (0.11) 
treatments  5.45* 2.62  6.92** 2.86 
  (1.76) (7.95)  (1.55) (7.83) 
strength of incentives  101.21 94.44  79.75 81.38 
  (112.28) (126.63)  (91.69) (114.76) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   0.79   0.38 
   (4.35)   (3.83) 
references   -0.75   -0.04 
   (3.24)   (2.44) 
JEL-micro   26.65   16.72 
   (9.80)   (15.75) 
JEL-theory   -105.00   -118.40 
   (79.17)   (89.20) 
JEL-labor   -52.51*   -74.98 
   (16.91)   (28.71) 
JEL-econometrics   25.03   11.01 
   (54.86)   (44.34) 
JEL-industrial   -57.23**   -64.83** 
   (9.85)   (12.06) 
JEL-international   158.10   43.78 
   (241.35)   (125.47) 
JEL-finance   -105.96   -88.83 
   (91.85)   (65.15) 
JEL-public   775.92   802.50 
   (784.87)   (803.92) 
JEL-health   -303.28   -357.24 
   (172.04)   (199.79) 
JEL-development   -109.35   -91.50** 
   (48.25)   (18.40) 
JEL-other   137.83   154.11 
   (178.97)   (190.73) 
share fem. auth.   38.55   15.20 
   (53.91)   (32.48) 
reputation   0.02   0.02 
   (0.04)   (0.04) 
number of auth.   -14.17   -18.11 
   (25.04)   (31.08) 
Constant -38.80 -86.09 -33.26 -50.52 -95.76 -70.31 
 (72.40) (97.76) (50.40) (80.96) (103.87) (29.70) 
N 321 319 310 321 319 310 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.15 0.15 0.27 





Table 12. Impact of Social Ties on Paper Quality (Full Results, only US papers, Raw 
Citations). 
 dependent variable: raw GS citations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AER 11.02** -50.43 -62.76 205.71*** 188.12*** 177.86 
 (1.29) (57.72) (110.95) (4.01) (15.39) (75.12) 
JEEA -246.62*** -129.66 -190.77 41.88*** 6.46 30.98* 
 (10.71) (167.88) (104.68) (3.61) (32.79) (9.32) 
minDist -1.53** 0.49 -5.33    
 (0.36) (3.58) (3.24)    
minDist * AER 43.08*** 55.87* 58.35*    
 (0.04) (13.00) (14.88)    
minDist * JEEA 63.10*** 25.22 46.41    
 (2.60) (51.03) (18.82)    
any-connection    22.71 -3.12 2.30 
    (9.73) (13.66) (14.24) 
any-connection * AER    -98.75** -67.08** -40.87 
    (12.13) (12.93) (39.00) 
any-connection * JEEA    0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (.) (.) (.) 
age 2.94* 3.72** 5.36 4.91 5.98 8.09 
 (0.69) (0.63) (1.94) (3.34) (2.98) (6.12) 
part. per treatment  0.27 0.44  0.40* 0.51 
  (0.26) (0.16)  (0.11) (0.24) 
treatments  15.30 16.27  14.92 14.00 
  (11.83) (16.36)  (10.12) (12.33) 
strength of incentives  230.44 239.56  174.77 194.69 
  (291.40) (297.02)  (203.53) (180.59) 
pages (EE-equivalent)   0.77   0.59 
   (2.98)   (2.51) 
references   0.43   1.57** 
   (0.99)   (0.24) 
JEL-micro   -17.35   -1.61 
   (21.58)   (42.80) 
JEL-theory   -20.22   -40.35* 
   (17.18)   (11.58) 
JEL-labor   -70.49   -84.30 
   (75.42)   (120.14) 
JEL-econometrics   17.90   32.08 
   (28.57)   (42.41) 
JEL-industrial   -116.63   -148.48 
   (55.47)   (92.63) 
JEL-international   0.00   0.00 
   (.)   (.) 
JEL-finance   -157.40   -204.02 
   (265.27)   (260.58) 
JEL-public   -34.85   -65.30 
   (18.16)   (48.98) 
JEL-health   -383.77   -395.10 
   (158.62)   (175.15) 
JEL-development   -449.65**   -355.63** 
   (65.82)   (63.15) 
JEL-other   197.88   163.93 
   (101.00)   (86.28) 
share fem. auth.   108.40   80.51 
   (92.09)   (73.85) 
reputation   -0.06   -0.06 
   (0.09)   (0.09) 
number of auth.   -11.85   -22.63 
   (18.72)   (39.43) 
Constant 27.21** -129.08 -129.46 -3.25 -138.73 -158.29 
 (6.07) (128.03) (158.09) (37.55) (124.25) (140.65) 
N 113 112 111 116 115 114 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.26 
Notes. OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by journal in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. 
 
 
